Lively Up Your Ontology

Bringing Deleuze into Ṣadrā's Modulated Universe

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A deep history of conceptions of a One that gives rise to the Many runs through Western and Islamic philosophy, from the pre-Socratics to Plato and Aristotle to the Greek and Islamic Neoplatonists such as al-Kindī and al-Farābī, to Avicenna and his Scholastic interpreters, through Baruch Spinoza, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, and G. W. F. Hegel, and into contemporary philosophy. Note the crucial contributions, over several centuries, of Arabic and Islamic thought. While most contemporary philosophy ignores that period, in fact the concept of One and Many makes no sense unless we include Arabic philosophy. This is because philosophers in the Muslim world synthesized Qurʾanic concepts of divine creation and knowledge with Greek concepts of emanation from the One. From this synthesis the towering Persian philosopher Abu ʿAli al-Husayn Ibn Sīnā (Bukhara, 980–1037), or Avicenna, innovated the concept of the univocity of being, whereby Being is predicated by univocity; Being remains One even as it gives rise to the Many.[1] This concept allows philosophy to understand all existents as expressions of a One that do not diminish its infinite capacity. In Avicenna's related concept of

indifference of essence, only Being in itself is not contingent, and it is indifferent to the mode of its presence in the intellect and the state of its particularization in an actual form.[2]

These concepts were to be foundational in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, though he would mistakenly attribute them to John Duns Scotus.[3] In Deleuze's well-known proclamation, "There has only ever been one ontological proposition: Being is univocal . . . from Parmenides to Heidegger it is the same voice which is taken up, in an echo which itself forms the whole deployment of the univocal. A single voice raises the clamour of being."[4] Shortly after, Deleuze argues that Spinoza (1632–77) converted the concept of univocity to immanence: "And it is in immanence that univocity finds its distinctly Spinozist formulation: God is said to be the cause of all things *in the very sense* (*eo sensu*) that he is said to be cause of himself."[5] These concepts were fundamental to Deleuze's philosophy of religion, as Philip Goodchild points out.[6] They recur throughout his oeuvre, undergoing another transformation in his encounters with Leibniz (1646–1716) and, briefly, Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947), in *The Fold*.

A way to conceive of multiplicity by modulation, drawn from process philosophy, gives us an ontology of a One that unfolds, in constant creative flux, into a Many—a universe whose unity lies in the singularity of its individuated parts, which parts, in turn, are constantly transforming and intensifying. Leibniz's cosmology, in which a great One subdivides without breaking into infinitesimal souls, informed Deleuze's conception of a universe interacting in infinitesimal multiplicity. The process philosophy of Whitehead informed Deleuze and Félix Guattari's concept of the universe as an ever-evolving network of machinic souls. However, the idea that being is predicated of all things not through univocity but through modulation was proposed by Muslim philosophers from the fourteenth century on, and developed completely by Iranian philosopher Ṣadr al-Dīn Muhammad al-Shīrāzī, known as Mullā Ṣadrā (Shiraz, 1571–1640). Islamic process philosophy and, in particular, the work of Ṣadrā, is the most important missing link in the history of the One-Many debate—missing, that is, from Western philosophy. Deleuze got his teeth into the concept of univocity and managed with great difficulty

to critique it to allow for disjunctive synthesis. Yet Ṣadrā had already performed a process critique of Avicenna's concept of univocity. I am plagued by the unrigorous thought that, if only Deleuze had read Ṣadrā, how much more easy, and lively—to cite the process philosopher Bob Marley—process-based ontology would be now.

The One-Many problem is newly hot in philosophy. Yet many thinkers remain at an impasse, still thinking of Being in substantialist terms. Ṣadrā's process realism can help. Ṣadrā is an existentialist to whom only being is real; a flow of becoming, the "act of being" (*al-ḥaqāʾiq al-wujūdāt*) both differentiates and unifies all entities. Importantly, Ṣadrā maintains that being is a real predicate (contrary to Immanuel Kant a century later), shared among the many with different gradations of intensity, and encompassing extramental being—that is, concretely existing things.[7] In his process philosophy existence is a force of individuation (*tashakkhus*), and in turn all entities are modulations of the singular reality that is existence. Ṣadrā's cosmology, in which entities individuate from a One and undergo change and intensification, is uncannily similar to that of Leibniz a century later. His process ontology strongly anticipates that of Whitehead. Yet there is scant possibility that these Western thinkers knew of his work.

This essay will draw out the links between Ṣadrā and some of the philosophers who inspired Deleuze in order to "lively up" our ontologies. I will introduce some of Ṣadrā's thinking by comparing his conception of the one-yet-many, intensifying, processual universe to those of Leibniz and Whitehead, and examining his critique of abstraction in light of *tashkīk*, systematic ambiguity, or modulation. I will argue that Ṣadrā's influence can make generative contributions to Deleuzean thought in terms of process realism, *tashkīk* as disjunctive synthesis, immanent causality, an embrace of entities in their singularity, and an optimistic, world-oriented approach. Finally, I will ask, How can engaging with Ṣadrā's work allow us to rethink the boundary between philosophy and theology? I suggest we can de-transcendentalize Islamic religious philosophy through operations similar to those Deleuze carried out on Leibniz's thought, and examine to what degree these concepts survive when the closed or divinely

ordered universe in which they are imagined is reconsidered as an open universe. To begin with, some historical background.

Arabic Philosophy within and beyond the West

By now it is widely acknowledged that Arabic[8] philosophy jumpstarted European philosophy on its translation into Latin beginning in the twelfth century. Among this large body of translated works, the second-most influential, after the Andalusian philosopher Averroes (Ibn Rushd, 1126–98), is the philosophy of Avicenna.[9] Avicenna's *Metaphysics*, the last book of *Kitāb al-Shifaʾ* (*The Book of Healing*), was completed by 1027 and translated into Latin in the twelfth century. In it Avicenna synthesizes Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy with certain strands of Qurʾanic thought, preparing the ground for later articulations of the One and the Many. Though most European Scholastics preferred the neo-Aristotelian Averroes,[10] who both accepted and critiqued Avicenna's philosophy, several were directly influenced by Avicenna's *Metaphysics*, including Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, William of Ockham, and Duns Scotus.[11]

During the Renaissance, Islamic sources gradually became vestigial in European thought. European scholars ceased to read and translate philosophy in Arabic by the late sixteenth century. Names like Avicenna, Averroes, and Algazel (Abu Hamid Al-Ghazālī, 1058–1111) dropped out of Western philosophy, to be replaced by the names of the Greek philosophers to whom they referred and the names of the Scholastics who had translated, applied, and developed their concepts. The names of the Scholastics fell out of use as well, sometimes because their arguments were superseded, sometimes because they were taken for granted. To some degree we can consider this an innocent process of scholarly elision, no different from what scholars do today when we neglect to cite the entire history of contributions to a contemporary concept. However, the disappearance of Arabic philosophers from Western philosophy coincided with the expulsion of Muslims from Portugal (1497) and Spain (1609–14). Therefore it seems that a desire to distance European philosophy from its Arabic and Islamic sources accompanied the political act of cleansing the lands that were to become Europe of their Muslim (and, to a large degree, Jewish) populations.

In both the West and the western Muslim world, there is a common belief that Arabic philosophy ceased altogether after Al-Ghazālī attacked the Aristotelian metaphysics of Averroes in *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*. This is not correct. It is true that in the western, largely Sunni, Muslim world, Peripatetic or Greek-derived philosophy fell out of use after the death of Averroes. However, Al-Ghazālī's prohibition did not hold sway in the eastern Muslim world. Philosophers in Iran, India, and Ottoman Asia Minor continued to debate and refine the ideas of Avicenna and many others who created new syntheses from Peripatetic, Qurʾanic, Sufi, and Shiʿi traditions.[12]

Western scholars until recently have dismissed the work of eastern Muslim thinkers as "not really philosophy" or, unhelpfully, have elevated it as mysticism because of its Qurʾanic component. Deleuze and Guattari fall prey to this Orientalist trope in *What Is Philosophy?*[13] Yet after the path of transmission to the West was severed, philosophy continued to develop in the Muslim world, in ways that both parallel and augment the work of their European contemporaries.

Historians of philosophy have made great headway in reevaluating the Arabic contribution to the history of modern Western thought. In terms of the One-Many question, they vigorously discuss the influential Islamic innovations in Neoplatonism and their European reception, often relating these to contemporary thought. For Deleuzians, however, the links remain tentative.[14]

A Brief Introduction to Islamic Process Thought and Ṣadrā

Islamic process ontology grew from Islamic Neoplatonism, which holds, with Proclus and other Greek Neoplatonists, that the One or God gives rise to the universe through emanation. This view began with Al-Kindī (Basra, ca. 800–870). Process thought also draws on the Sufi concept of the unity of being (*wajdat al-wujūd*) elaborated by the Andalusian mystical philosopher Ibn al-ʿArabi (Murcia, 1165–1240). From these assertions of emanation and unity, a number of Persian Islamic philosophers developed the argument that being has modulated degrees of intensity: these include Avicenna's student

Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī (Khorasan, 1201–74) and the Illuminationist thinker Shahāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (Suhraward, 1154–91). From these currents, as well as *kalām* theology, Shi'i and Sufi philosophy, Gnosticism, and a new engagement with Aristotle, Ṣadrā developed an original synthesis striking for its completeness and its logical rigor.

Ṣadrā al-Din Muhammad b. Ibrahim b. Yahya Qawamī Shīrāzī was born in 1571 to a courtly family in Shiraz. He studied, traveled, was apparently ostracized for his political independence, and finally was invited to teach at a new philosophy madrassa in Shiraz. There he completed his most important works, written in Arabic, as was customary, including the massive *Asfār* or *Four Journeys*. Sajjad Rizvi recounts that in 1634 the English traveler Sir Thomas Herbert described the madrassa: "[Indeed] Shyraz has a colledge wherein is read Philosophy, Astrology, Physick, Chemistry and the Mathematicks; so as 'tis the more famoused through Persia."[15] Ṣadrā died in about 1650 in Basra while making the hajj.[16]

Ṣadrā's influence informed every subsequent school of philosophy in Iran and elsewhere in the eastern Muslim world. In recent decades Ṣadrā has become something of a state philosopher in Iran, where some scholars use his work to justify a religious-nationalist philosophical dogma.[17] Ṣadrā is also the Persian philosopher best known in the West, with numerous monographs devoted to him and translations of some of his works into English, French, and other languages.[18] Henry Corbin, William Chittick, and Seyyed Hossein Nasr, pioneering scholars and translators of eastern Islamic thought, discuss his work in volumes on Islamic philosophy and Sufism.[19] Ibrahim Kalin, a student of Nasr, compares Ṣadrā's metaphysical epistemology to modern Western theological philosophy; Cécile Bonmariage relates Ṣadrā's work to his Avicennian and Neoplatonic contexts; and Mohammed Rustom examines Ṣadrā's oeuvre in light of his exegesis of the Qurʾan.[20] Christian Jambet, a student of Corbin, focuses on mystical and Platonist tendencies in Ṣadrā's philosophy, while Rizvi pares away some of the religious and Orientalist preoccupations with Ṣadrā to treat him as a modern philosopher.[21] In one of the few Euro-Islamic cross-cultural philosophical inquiries, some Iranian philosophers deploy Ṣadrā in combination with Martin Heidegger, as the concept of a Being whose presence can be disclosed to

nondiscursive contemplation is central to the work of both.[22] Only a few of us have so far attempted to bridge Ṣadrā with Deleuze.[23]

Ṣadrā in Comparative Context

Here I introduce elements of Ṣadrā's process realism by comparing them to the process philosophies that Deleuze came to embrace from Leibniz and Whitehead. (Comparisons with Henri Bergson and Spinoza would also be very fruitful, but they are beyond this essay's scope.) I compare their approaches to the One-Many problem, intensity and the question of who or what has a soul, the question of matter, singularity and the critique of abstraction, and creativity.

What Is It to Be an Entity in the Universe?

Leibniz, Ṣadrā, and Whitehead all argue, in their different ways, that the universe is a differentiated unity that tends toward increased intensity. All things are connected; they are articulations or individuations of the One. Each of them argues, in remarkably (Islamic) Neoplatonist style, that God has the greatest degree of positive reality, and that every individual—Leibniz's monad, Ṣadrā's singular entity, Whitehead's actual entity—has the potential to realize some degree of God's reality. Indeed, they all concur that each entity is drawn to greater actualization in the process of God's infinite self-enjoyment. Each of them values the irreducible individuality of each entity. How and to what degree things change, endure, and perfect themselves is understood differently by each philosopher.

In Leibniz's cosmology, a great One subdivides without breaking into infinitesimal souls. Each monad has its own entelechy, or capacity to realize potentials. Leibniz defines God as a "supreme substance, which is unique, universal and necessary, nothing outside of it being independent of it," which "must contain as much reality as is possible."[24] God, as sufficient reason, causes the monads to realize more perceptions until they begin to apprehend the causal connectedness of things.[25] The soul represents the entire universe, but only certain parts distinctly: "It cannot all at once unroll everything that is enfolded in it, for its complexity is infinite."[26] The body of each monad feels its connections to all the others, "so that he who sees all

might read in each what is happening everywhere, and even what has happened or shall happen, observing in the present that which is far off as well in time as in place."[27] Microperceptions are what the monad cannot quite unfold, Deleuze writes: they are folds that go in every direction, connecting each monad dimly with everything else.[28]

Ṣadrā too found a way to conceive of Being or Existence, *al-wujūd*, as an all-encompassing monad. Being is a unified reality graded in degrees of intensity, which encompasses all things in a transformative flow (*al-sarayān al-wujūd*, the flow of being).[29] "All that which is simple in Its essential Reality is, by virtue of Its absolute Unity, all things."[30] It is a self-unfolding existence, *al-wujūd al-munbasiṭ*, that by its nature gives rise to the ever-changing universe of differentiated things. Ṣadrā agrees with Avicenna that things receive their being from God, the only independent being. However, Avicenna, stuck with an Aristotelian understanding of substance, cannot account for how things change, and his concept of the univocity of being gives a static conception of the universe. Ṣadrā's revision of Avicenna follows his Persian predecessors Bahmanyār ibn Marzubān (d. 1065/66) and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (1201–74), who submit univocity to a process critique, arguing that Being is predicated of all things through modulation.[31] As Bahmanyār wrote: "Know that being is predicated of what is included within it by the predication of modulation [*al-tashkīk*] and not univocity [*al-tawāṭuʾ*]. This means that the being that has no cause is prior by nature to that being which has a cause, and hence the being of substance is prior to the being of accident. Furthermore, some being is more potent, some less."[32] Existence is thus a process of modulation or individuation (*tashkīk al-wujūd*, the modulation of being). *Tashkīk* derives from the verb *shakk*, to doubt, connoting a skepticism that refines an entity by sculpting away what is not real about it. Ṣadrā's universe comprises a complex hierarchy, arranged in degrees (not kinds) from the three worlds of nature (the sensible realm), souls (the imaginal realm, *ʿalam al-khayal*), and intelligences (the intelligible realm) to the pyramid of angels, to the divine throne. Yet these levels are differentiated not by species, as Aristotelian substance philosophy would have it, but by intensity.[33] Intensity is a set of modulated scales: "Being is a single, simple reality having neither genus nor differentia, nor a

definition or a demonstration or a *definiens*. It only admits of degrees by perfection and deficiency [*bi-l-kamāl wa-l-naqṣ*], by priority and posteriority [*al-taqqadum wa-l-taʾakkhur*], and by independence and dependence [*bi-l-ghiná wa-l-ḥāja*]."[34] Ṣadrā invented the concept of substantial motion (*harakat al-jawhariyya*) to suggest that substances undergo transformation in the course of their being. Substantial motion implies not only a horizontal transformation—for example, of an acorn growing into a tree or a child into an adult—but also a vertical or divine transformation. Here he describes how every entity has an internal potential to intensify that can actually move it from one species to another:

> Know that the form of the natural, elemental body is potentially inanimate, and the form of mineral things is inanimate and potentially plant. The plant's form—that is, the vegetal soul—is a growing, self-nourishing, and reproducing substance and potentially an animal. The animal's form—that is, its soul—is actually a sensate substance and potentially a human. Children's souls are actually sensate and potentially intellecting. Adults' souls are actually intellecting and potentially philosophers. Philosophers are actually sages and potentially angels, so when they depart from their bodies, they become angels.[35]

Substantial motion entails that things become more real as they get closer to God, the only reality. "The act of being is the most real of things with respect to real effectuation, because what is other than it becomes effectively real through it."[36] As Leibniz's monads may increase their area of clear perception, so each of Ṣadrā's monads has the potential to become more real.[37] In Ṣadrā's salubrious understanding, the divine reality does not crush or annihilate the individual but individuates it. Entities undergo continuous becoming and intensification from within: as in Leibniz, the "interior" is the inverse of the universe.

Whitehead's complex and avowedly process-based cosmology makes for fascinating comparison to that Ṣadrā devised three centuries earlier. Whitehead's cosmos is an interconnected, open whole in a constant, atomistic process of transformation. Each entity, or actual occasion, is a unique creative occurrence that has the potential to realize—that is, to positively prehend—the infinity of entities

to which it is connected. Abandoning the theological cosmology of Ṣadrā and Leibniz, Whitehead nevertheless keeps God in the loop because God is the only being who prehends all the connections—much like the monadic God of Leibniz and of Ṣadrā. Whitehead's final cause is "the self-creativity of the universe," to which each actual occasion contributes in the degree of its subjective intensity: "The absolute standard of such intensity is that of the primordial nature of God."[38] Whitehead's creative universe is a teleology: he hopes that the universe is getting better, that is, it is increasing in complexity.[39] However, when a new actuality occurs in a place where it cannot be prehended positively, it delays the progress of complexity. Hence Whitehead's striking characterization of evil as bad timing (and placement): "Insistence on birth at the wrong season is the trick of evil."[40]

All three thinkers conceive of a universe in which all things are connected by a common unity that is most real and most intense. Yet in all their cosmologies, individual entities matter. In Ṣadrā entities undergo continuous becoming and intensification from within: as in Leibniz, the soul contains the universe. In all three we can begin to conceive of beings as subjects with a deep, potentially infinite interiority whose very infinity is guaranteed by its relations with the "outside."

Intensity

Ṣadrā, Leibniz, and Whitehead all value entities in their singularity, which is a measure of their intensity. I find that each of them models intensity in a remarkably similar way, as a point that inversely reflects the infinite. All of them state that every entity in the universe is participating in a process of intensification, or God realization.

In Leibniz's universe the infinitesimal is not just what is most tiny: it is the inverse of the infinite. A monad is the inverted image of God: where God is $\infty/1$, the monad is $1/\infty$, and its clear region is $1/n$.[41] Calculus allowed Leibniz to show that the position of each monad made it a unique and necessary point of inflection in the great curve of the cosmos. Ṣadrā, of course, lived prior to the invention of calculus, but his philosophy is similarly a monadology in which a part may contain the whole from its point of view.[42] Ṣadrā draws on a

powerful metaphor from Shiʿi cosmology that relates deployable being to the primordial point. According to Imam ʿAli (whom Shiʿi Muslims believe to have been the rightful successor to Muhammad), the entire Qurʾan is encompassed in the first letter of the *Basmala*, and he, Imam ʿAli, is the dot under that letter.[43] So you have an image of the highest human who has attained such intensity that he becomes almost like God, capable of concentrating the creative force of the Qurʾan in his own person. Leibniz would say that Imam ʿAli had expanded his monad's clear zone to such a degree that its infinitesimal point corresponded to the infinity of the cosmos.

In Ṣadrā's universe each individual entity intensifies as waves of being traverse it. Each individual point approximates the infinite by becoming more singular and thus more real. Individuals differ not by species (in Aristotelian fashion) but by intensity. A person is more intense than a horse; a horse is more intense than a flower; a flower is more intense than a coffee cup, but they are all in the process of becoming intense (to use a term of Deleuze and Guattari). In Ṣadrā we hear the Sufi restless melancholy of love and longing for the Beloved that draws all things toward God: God's desire for self-knowledge is the energy that traverses and transforms them.

For Whitehead, every single entity in the universe is unique, and the goal of each entity is increased positive prehension, that is to say, increased intensity. God is a "lure for feeling" in Whitehead, an invitation to positively prehend more of the universe. Whitehead's statement that "each novel actuality in the temporal world contributes such elements as it can to a realization in God free from inhibitions of intensity" could be attributed to Ṣadrā and Leibniz as well.[44]

Whitehead's cosmology is atomistic in that actual entities concresce, complete, and effectively die, becoming data for other entities. How would Ṣadrā respond to Whitehead's atomism? He critiqued Islamic atomistic ontology that held that all things are made of discrete atoms, arguing instead that "things" are real, if temporary, structures of events.[45] In this he would be in agreement with Whitehead. Both Ṣadrā and Whitehead also describe entities as becoming fully actualized before they pass on to become something else. The difference between them seems to be one of emphasis: Ṣadrā on flow, Whitehead on saccadic jumps.

For all three thinkers, individuated entities become more intense by making explicit their connections to all other things. Leibniz argues that a monad can increase its clear region, bringing into consciousness things that were only dimly felt. (We can practice this in exercises similar to meditation.) In Whitehead each actual entity is self-creating, as it transforms the incoherence of prehensions into a coherent, complex feeling, or satisfaction.[46] Ṣadrā, by contrast, emphasizes the horizontal connections of entities to each other less than the vertical connections of entities to God. However, contemplation of the world brings a person closer to the experience of the flow of being.

What Is Matter?

For Ṣadrā, materiality consists of privation: the more material something is, the less real it is. However, the concept of being as modulation equipped him to value the being of matter, in contrast to the monorealism of Sufi thought, especially in Ibn al-ʿArabi.[47] Sufism argues that the phenomenal experience of multiplicity is illusory and that, through contemplating the unity of God, a believer can pass through the veils of illusion. By contrast, Ṣadrā argues in the *Asfār* that the ontological primacy of being requires that being be actual and realized in time. This means that matter, even though it consists of privation, is necessary as the vehicle for the process of change. Moreover, in a universe characterized by gradation, since God has both existence and knowledge, every natural object must possess some degree of existence and knowledge, even if they are quite rudimentary.[48] Ṣadrā argues that matter, as pure potentiality, yearns to become something more intense; in fact, as Fazlur Rahman puts it, "matter is characterized by the *greatest* intensity of yearning for the higher in the entire existence since it is the most deficient in all existence."[49] We can compare Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the machinic phylum, in which matter is not inert but provides the potentials for local forms or individuations.

Leibniz treats matter in similarly ambivalent fashion: it is necessary for the composition of souled beings. Leibniz, as readers of the *Monadology* know, proposes that every monad is a matter-soul composite. Leibniz argued that everything, to the degree that

it has sensation and appetite (or desire), is a soul. This makes it possible to argue that every material entity, down to the most minuscule particle, is (or has) a soul. Matter makes up the monad's body, which provides both its unique point of view on the cosmos and the source of its confused perceptions.[50] God assigns these limits to monads, Leibniz writes; otherwise a monad "would be God if it knew distinctly the infinity it enfolds."[51] In other words, matter is what prevents entities from gaining knowledge of their self-comprehension of the universe, that is, of God realization. Here Leibniz's thought resonates strongly with the Sufi argument that the illusion of matter is what maintains the separateness of souls.

Ṣadrā's Critique of Abstraction

Ṣadrā's radical break with Avicenna was to argue that the multiplicity of things is not due to their quiddities, or essences, but to their singularities. In Ṣadrā's thought existences are real, while abstractions, such as language, are nothing. Substantialist thought relies on essence or quiddity (*māhiyya* in Arabic, "what it is"): the Aristotelian category something belongs to, like "horse." "The Simple (Being) is all existent things with respect to their being and perfection," Ṣadrā writes, "but not with respect to their privations and imperfections."[52] As James Morris explains, this means that any particular existent A is a compound of a quiddity, A-ness, and Being.[53] For example, this fly on my windowsill is a combination of the general category of flyness and Being: its singular little body and its unique zooming, resting, and tasting here and now. I myself am a combination of quiddities like woman, scholar, left-handed, and curly-haired, but the more I persist in existing, the more these privative categories cease to encompass me, and the more real I become. As I go along in life and shed the abstract and clichéd aspects of myself, my participation in the single and simple Being becomes more complete.

Unfortunately, our understanding necessarily abstracts. As Ṣadrā writes, "That which is experienced is being but that which is understood is quiddity."[54] But these categories distract us from the reality of being. By contrast, contingent existences are "simple lights without any darkness."[55] We can compare the habits that Charles Sanders Peirce and Bergson grudgingly accept as necessary for thought,

though they need to be swept away for creativity to emerge. Hence the importance of intuition for Bergson and Ṣadrā and of induction for Peirce: all are ways of reaching beyond discourse to capture something more real. As Azadeh Emadi points out, both Deleuze's Bergsonian critique of cliché and Ṣadrā's critique of abstraction turn attention back to nondiscursive reality:

> The image that forces us to break the cliché and experience our senses makes us aware of some thing that is imperceptible, where perception cannot form into a conceptual form. For Deleuze, sense perception is not an end in itself. Rather, it comes after the breakdown of clichéd thinking and leads to new thought by revealing "the powerlessness at the heart of thought." . . . Challenging the sensory-motor schema that Deleuze writes about, results in a more experiential knowledge. For Ṣadrā, this experiential knowledge is closer to the reality of *things*.[56]

For an exercise in *tashkīk*, think of the difference between the category "horse" and a horse that you know; or, if you know no horses, you can do this with the category "fly" and a fly passing through your open window. That horse or insect is a concrete, individuated existence (*shakhs*). You will notice that the more precisely you try to think about the creature, the more its being evades your mind. First a set of statements about it may populate your thoughts ("the fly buzzes and darts around"), then metaphors ("the fly darts and settles like a caffeinated mind"). As you keep focusing, all these words will fall away and you will find yourself in the presence of the fly (perhaps at first thinking, "I am in the presence of the fly") and of the changing universe that includes the hungry, seeking fly, the opened window, your own observing and growing self, perhaps the evaporating liquid in the bottom of your coffee cup that attracted its attention, the breeze, time, and weather. Finally, for a moment, you may feel the presence of being. Presential knowledge (*ʿilm hudūrī*), or knowledge of things in their extreme singularity, comes closest to the flow of being.[57] As Jambet writes, Spinoza's statement, "He who knows singular things knows God," equally characterizes Ṣadrā.[58]

In their singularity, experiencing the transformation affecting them, things exhibit their passage to a state of greater intensity and reality. (The matter in the form of coffee cup, deficient though it is, is

yearning to become.) This exercise usefully compares to the White-headian study of concrescence, where not only the fly (or horse) but all the entities in its immediate universe mutually transform, increasing their positive prehensions of one another and their environment.

Like other eastern Islamic philosophers, Ṣadrā argued that reality is composed of three realms: the sensible, the imaginal, and the intelligible. (This is a great advance over dualist thought that proposes only two realms of the sensible, or matter, and the intelligible, or ideas.) The soul intellects not by abstracting from sensibilia but by transforming from sensible to imaginal to intellect.[59] Intellectual abstraction therefore has *less* reality than imaginal images: abstraction (*amr i'tibārī*) blocks the path of contemplation.[60] By contrast, singularities stimulate the imagination.

In its singularity, that fly in the above exercise is a sharp little inflection of the flow of being. It is immanence, which cannot be known discursively, Ṣadrā argued, but only through contemplation or presential knowledge.[61]

Ṣadrā's critique of abstraction has much in common with Deleuze and Guattari's affirmation that absolute singularity opens onto the infinite, to boundless freedom, because it is not bound to meaning systems. Philosophy should make connections between singularities, in the virtual; it is speculative, fabulatory. Art's "uselessness," similarly, lies in its singularity, excess, empiricism.[62] I find that Ṣadrā's argument also brings inspiring new concepts to the table. Paying attention to phenomenal experience opens one's intuition to nondiscursive experience, the ground of creativity.

Creativity: A Limit to Religious Philosophy?
The question of creativity poses a limit in teleological, God-oriented thought systems like those of Ṣadrā and Leibniz: theirs are closed universes. Even Whitehead's cosmos is a teleology, in that like Ṣadrā and Leibniz he assumes the cosmos is increasing in complexity. In an open universe, creativity necessarily consists in inventing something that has never existed before. In a closed universe, I argue, creativity lies in discovering connections.

In "What Is an Event?" Deleuze analyzes a coincidence between Leibniz's and Whitehead's conceptions of an event as, first, an

extensive series whereby one element forms an infinite series with others, and second, an intensive series characterized by the unique variations in matter. For Leibniz, the event occurs in a monad as it intensifies its connections with the universe. For Whitehead, the event occurs in a concrescence of prehensions that privatizes and subjectifies "public" data. Deleuze remarks that these processes remain very similar.[63] The difference between Leibniz and Whitehead arises when the question of creativity is introduced. (This will be the difference with Ṣadrā as well.) For Leibniz's monads are closed, in harmony with God's ordered universe, and perceive the world only indirectly, while Whitehead's prehensions are open to the world, that is, to each other. Whitehead delegates a great deal of creative initiative to individual events, including each actual entity's aesthetic "decision" regarding the manner in which it will prehend and internalize a given datum.[64] In modern thought, as Deleuze briskly summarizes, "Even God desists from being a Being who compares worlds and chooses the richest compossible. He becomes Process, a process that at once affirms incompossibilities and passes through them."[65] Whitehead's universe, Deleuze argues, includes incompossible totalities that Leibniz's closed universe could not permit.

But perhaps Deleuze overargues the difference between the closed universe of Leibniz and the open one of Whitehead.

For Ṣadrā as for Leibniz, creativity consists in giving up one's prejudices and submitting to the will of God. This does not sound like the modern conception of creativity as inventing something from nothing. However, there is another kind of creativity, namely, to identify connections among things hitherto thought to be separate. This is a typically Islamic (and religious in general) notion of creativity: God comprehends everything, and human creativity consists not in inventing but in discovering relations among the things in God's cosmos. The influential eleventh-century Persian literary theorist Abd al-Qahir al-Jurjānī (Jurjān, d. 1078) wrote that the imagination discovers hidden affinities between seemingly disparate things, revealing the harmony of God's universe. "Human nature is so created," Al-Jurjānī wrote,

and human instinctive and innate qualities are such, that when something appears whence it is not usually expected to appear, and when it emerges from a source that is not its usual one, the soul feels deeper fondness of, and greater affection for it. It is as exciting and amazing to reveal the existence of something in a place in which it is not known to belong, as it is to create something which does not exist at all, or whose very existence is not realized.[66]

This notion of creativity does describe creative acts, for example in science and in art, that draw attention to unrecognized relationships. I think most creativity consists in such acts.

Ṣadrā and Leibniz allow for a certain creativity in the choice individuals have to submit to their longing for the Beloved. Whitehead grants a much greater but still qualified freedom to individual creativity. Even though the universe's ultimate aim is intensification in God, each actual occasion is responsible for its decision to actualize the "lure for feeling."[67]

Ṣadrā's conception of the imaginal realm is both a help and a hindrance for thinking about creativity. It helps account for nondiscursive creativity. Ṣadrā argues that all existents pass through the imaginal realm on the way "down" to the sensible.[68] That means that the imaginal realm is richer than the material world, not to mention the impoverished world of quiddities. It hinders because it appears, in his religious view, that humans do not add anything to the imaginal realm; we (or at least the prophets among us) just discover it. Furthermore, Ṣadrā warns us to distinguish between prophetic vision and mere fancy. Prophets and gifted dreamers may draw true visions from the imaginal realm, but most of us are probably just hallucinating. So we would have to worry the concept of the imaginal realm a bit further to conceive it as truly open. Still, the concept of the imaginal realm beckons artists and dreamers to focus their intuition and draw out images of things that do not exist in the physical world.

In short, Ṣadrā, Leibniz, and Whitehead *all* limit agency in a way because they posit a God the realization of which is the goal of creativity. They all imagine universes that are unimaginably complex and in which every point has the potential to intensify itself until

it attains the One. In each of them the concept of God sets a certain limitation. Clearly, Whitehead's cosmos is the most open and creatively free of all three. Would a completely open cosmology such as Deleuze describes permit even more freedom, or does this require giving up the progress toward intensification and complexity?

Deleuzean Thought, Refreshed by Ṣadrā

This comparative introduction to Ṣadrā complete, and these important doubts about religious philosophy raised, I now move to the central question of this essay.

In a thrilling concatenation of Leibniz's concept of sufficient reason and Whitehead's concept of event, Deleuze is able in *The Fold* to argue that Being can be predicated of the infinitely differentiated *and* interconnected reality of the event. He reworks sufficient reason to behave like modulation.[69] It is a theory that all things coexist in a contact that can be intensified or perfected. A theory of heaven on earth—if a bit depopulated. What could Ṣadrā's concept of Being as modulation bring to it? At the very least, could it have facilitated Deleuze's path of reasoning?[70] I argue that Ṣadrā's view of the One-Many relationship with the advantage of process realism invigorates and usefully critiques Deleuze's thought, in light of the following concepts: univocity by modulation; immanent causality; pain, enjoyment, and faith; an embrace of entities as real, individuated moments of process; and an optimistic method.

Univocity by Modulation

As mentioned above, the source of the concept of univocity is not Duns Scotus but Avicenna, and, unknown to Europeans, Ṣadrā and his predecessors invented a process critique of this concept: being is predicated of all things not through univocity but through modulation or *tashkīk*. *Tashkīk* is a *method* for recognizing the internal motion of things, substantial motion, toward greater reality and differentiation. This method recognizes the lifelessness of essences—that is, names and categories—with the goal of opening our awareness to the lively and intensifying flow of being. (I note that this method and goal are very similar to those of Bergson that Deleuze adapts in

Bergsonism and the cinema books.) In many of Deleuze's earlier works, it seems to me that he is struggling mightily to come up with a concept very close to *tashkīk*. *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense* both wage war with substantialism, in part because Deleuze is working with Avicenna (via Duns Scotus).

In his critique of Aristotle in *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze notes that a concept of difference in itself cannot arise from a philosophy based on identity and representation. Being connects heterogeneous differences.[71] Here already the need for a process ontology arises. Deleuze's solution, here and in *Logic of Sense*, was the concept of sense: "*the expressed of the proposition*, . . . a pure event which inheres or subsists in the proposition."[72] Sense refines or sculpts a proposition by discovering what it expresses—similarly to how *tashkīk* critiques an entity by seeing it as a modulation of the flow of being.

Deleuze again comes close to carrying out Ṣadrā's process critique of reality when he embraces Avicenna's concept of univocity of being (which he attributed to Duns Scotus) and critiques it to allow for disjunctive synthesis, which makes it possible to think a universe of interconnected yet incompossible singularities. What is needed, he writes, is "a plastic, anarchic and nomadic principle, contemporaneous with the process of individuation, no less capable of dissolving and destroying individuals than of constituting them temporarily; intrinsic modalities of being, passing from one 'individual' to another, circulating and communicating underneath matters and forms."[73] Deleuze calls for a process critique of substantialism—and Ṣadrā, I argue, answers.

Later, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the plane of consistency, or the virtual, is "necessarily a plane of immanence and univocality."[74] It includes intensities that have not taken form, capacities without body that are immanent to the plane of organization (the actual), which negotiates intensities that destabilize it. I hear *tashkīk* in this account of a flowing movement of modulation. Emadi underscores the complementarity between plane of immanence in Deleuze and Guattari and Ṣadrā's cosmology: "Ṣadrā's process of intensification finds a parallel in Deleuze's thinking about the plane of immanence. . . . Through a process of actualisation, the

relationship between actual and virtual, visible and invisible, is constantly remade as connections between these states are established and dissolved. This process, like Ṣadrā's method of the invisible becoming visible, produces singularisation."[75]

As Goodchild points out, Deleuze developed a method of creative disjunction in the course of his systematic engagement with the philosophy of religion. The method arises initially from Deleuze's irritation with the concept that God, or the primordial being, is completely simple and contains all reality; thus all other beings are defined by negation.[76] This Neoplatonist concept, which Deleuze first encountered in Kant, is also Ṣadrā's starting point from Islamic Neoplatonism. Rebelling against the monad God, Deleuze takes up the cause of the entities that arise not as negations of the divine unity but affirmatively through a principle of differentiation. "The sole thing that is divine," Deleuze and Guattari write, "is the nature of an energy of disjunctions."[77] Entities in Ṣadrā's cosmology are indeed negations of divine unity, in that they are defined as privation. However, the universe of differentiated singularities, affirmed by substantial motion and *tashkīk*, is real, necessary, and necessarily in constant motion.

I have my own doubt at this point, though. Is synthesis in Ṣadrā disjunctive or conjunctive? If the latter, how much does that matter?

Immanent Causality and the Event

Ṣadrā's two kinds of causality, chronological and divine, give rise to two series of changes, shown on Emadi's diagram (fig. 1): on the *x*-axis, material causality of growth and transformation, in a process milieu; on the *y*-axis, intensification. An individual existent experiences both kinds of causality as, respectively, transformation and intensity: we saw this in the example of a person who moves in her lifetime from animal to potentially angel.

Similarly, Deleuze argues that the event is composed of a physical series and an ideal or virtual series, as well as the tissue or lining between the two that folds in unique ways, reflecting the event in the individual: indeed, the individual is that folded lining.[78] He diminishes the importance of physical causality in favor of the eternal, ideal side of the event. The ideal series is a set of changes in *sense*, which I have compared to the refining process of *tashkīk*.

Fig. 1. Azadeh Emadi, *Diagram of Substantial Motion*.

Where Deleuze's thought most closely approaches Ṣadrā's is in the idea of the potential perfectibility that lies in seeing beyond material causality to ideal (for Ṣadrā, divine) causality:

> It is a question of attaining this will that the event creates in us; of becoming the quasi-cause of what is produced in us, the Operator; of producing surfaces and linings in which the event is reflected, finds itself again as incorporeal and manifests in us the neutral splendor which it possesses in itself in its impersonal and pre-individual nature, beyond the general and the particular, the public and the private. It is a question of *becoming a citizen of the world*.[79]

In these sentences echo conceptions of intensification that resonate through the course of Deleuze's writings: the Nietzschean desire to create an act worthy of the eternal return, the Spinozan adequate idea, the Bergsonian point of indetermination that perceives the universe, and the depersonalized Life that incarnates immanence. Along the way, Deleuze brings conceptions of causality from Leibniz and Whitehead to these ideas of the event. In each case Deleuze is seeking a way to describe how the individual might shed the binds of

chronological and material causality to participate in immanent causality. It is his idea of heaven on earth. Those "surfaces and linings in which the event is reflected" sound to me like the individuation of entities as they become more singular and real, in Ṣadrā.

Both Ṣadrā and Deleuze experiment with subtracting time from the world to grasp that there exists only a single Being in process, a single Event. Echoing Islamic mysticism, Deleuze writes, "What men grasp as past and future, God lives it in its eternal present"[80]— where God is defined as Chronos, the divine present. To some people, including me, the idea that time (and space) can drop out of the universe, leaving a single hypercompressed EverythingAtOnce, feels suffocating rather than sublime. Fortunately for us, both Ṣadrā and Deleuze emphasize at various points that Being or Event individuate and are experienced individually. Here enters the creativity of each individual entity's personal striving.

The event is a wound, writes Deleuze.[81] He means this in the Nietzschean sense that the event cuts into a person's life and brings them into contact with an unbearable truth that exceeds them. Such wounding also occurs in the mystical sense of divine love, like that testified by Rumi and Teresa of Ávila. In both cases, the event wounds individuals by inviting them to take part in something more real than they are. The event actualizes and destroys the individual in the same gesture—in my Ṣadrian metaphor, it sculpts them. Deleuze describes how the assent to participate feels: "a sort of leaping in place [*saut sur place*] of the whole body as it exchanges its organic will for a spiritual will."[82] I contend that the very same "leaping in place" occurs to the individual in Ṣadrā's account as the individual shifts on axis, as it were, from the x-axis of temporal causality to the y-axis of divine causality. Now the individual's role is to intensify—that is, to actualize—what is virtual to the event (Deleuze), to increase the realness of the event (Ṣadrā).

Pain and Enjoyment; Faith in This World
Pain—wrenching, transfiguring pain—is a motif throughout Deleuze's works; the masochist who creates a body without organs is just one example.[83] It is the pain of opening to the Open. That openness, when it arrives, is often described as neutrality; it is hard to feel

in Deleuze's writing the joy, power, or pleasure that would reward the wrenching effort of stripping away the comforts of habit and cliché. A similar pain characterizes the mystic's longing for reunion with the divine. It is the pain of opening not to the Open but to God: the most important difference between immanent and divine philosophy. Goodchild points out that the mystic is the limit point in Deleuze's thought, especially in Bergson, and that the problem of "expressing the mystic's beatitude or creative emotion itself within reason" is what propels Deleuze's study of Spinoza.[84]

How easy is it to convert the mystic's experience into an immanentist "faith in this world"? Deleuze's work expresses the mystic's pain but not the mystic's joy. I think that in the struggle to immanentize mysticism Deleuze strips it of content, as when he writes, "The mystical soul actively plays the whole of the universe, and reproduces the opening of a Whole in which there is *nothing to see or contemplate*."[85]

Missing in most of Deleuze's writing is enjoyment of the singularities and lines of flight that his philosophy labors to make room for. Why? Perhaps it is the post–May 1968 despondency that philosophy has so little power against the omnivorous capitalist machine. I suspect a whiff of Christian asceticism as well. But as many have noted, Deleuze's despair is out of step with the precarity of contemporary life—we hardly need to be reminded how awful the world is.[86] A touch of Ṣadrian optimism might make Deleuzian thought more relevant. I am thinking of Ṣadrā's embrace of the earthly world and the importance he gives to nondiscursive contemplation.

In contrast to Christian asceticism that denies the material world, Muslim traditions of nonascetic devotion show that the spiritual life can be joyful with no need to abnegate the world. Indeed, to disavow the world would be blasphemous, for it is God's creation. In Ṣadrā's thought, enjoyment is part of the solution. The singularities sculpted by *tashkīk* can be apprehended only by noncognitive knowledge by presence (*ʿilm ḥuḍūrī*). While in Sufism knowledge by presence means direct knowledge of the presence of God, in Ṣadrā it is knowledge of things in their extreme singularity and interconnectedness that comes closest to the flow of being.[87] Thus Ṣadrā's thought also allows a more enthusiastic embrace of the world.

Deleuze hesitates to affirm entities in their actuality, from political movements to cinematic narratives, for fear they would reinforce the reign of cliché. Things need to be volatile, seething with their own virtuality, to be productive and generative. I share this view, but I seek a more generous vocabulary to describe the beauty of this volatile world. Ṣadrā's *tashkīk* method of denying the reality of essences easily deconstructs the reign of clichés, showing that they are unreal and toothless. His emphasis on the reality of becoming shows that reality is a constant movement of variation in which all things seek greater reality: all we need to do is recognize it. We can do that by cultivating knowledge by presence (*ʿilm ḥuḍūrī*), an intuitive knowledge of the flow of being.[88] "The *wujūd* of every existent is this existent itself *in concreto*, and that which is *in concreto* cannot be a mental concept. . . . As for knowledge of the reality of *wujūd*, that cannot be other than illuminative presence and real witnessing."[89] I can get a little grasp of the flow of being, and at the same time express my faith in this world, by appreciating that moment when the fly zooms in the window and stops for a moment on my coffee cup— or that moment when I join the noisy, motley, determined crowd marching in the streets of Vancouver to protest the pipeline that would bring diluted bitumen to our shores.

Participating fully in such events, we come into direct contact with the flow of being. It is like the Bergsonian critique of cliché—but joyful. Contemplation in turn strengthens one's grasp of the Real and deepens one's creative capacity. In short, Ṣadrā's philosophy is its own reward.

Process, Time, and an Open Universe

Enjoyment and contemplation require faith—so that you can relax in the confidence that the objects of your enjoyment and contemplation are good and good for you. Immanentism, or an atheist cosmology, cannot help but be uneasy, for it places its faith in the unknown. For the three philosophers I focused on earlier, Ṣadrā, Leibniz, and Whitehead, the universe is progressing toward ever more complexity, that is, ever more singularized entities in ever-richer connections with one another. And this is because they are drawn by God. I confess that I am unable to believe this. Is it possible to keep these

beautiful conceptions of a complexifying universe without a divine guiding principle? Or do we have to accept not knowing whether the universe is becoming more complex or more chaotic?

Both a general Islamic eschatology and a more specifically Shiʿi understanding of the end of time impose a messianic philosophy of time in Ṣadrāʾs universe. Most radically, the Qurʾan suggests that time is an effect of the act of being. "And the heavens are rolled up in His right hand" (Qurʾan 39:67) implies that God makes the universe spin out and can spin it back in at will. This eschatological view seems to leave little room for freedom, for a conception of the future as open, or for a disjunctive universe.

Deleuze opened up Leibniz's universe by snipping the closed loop of the best possible universe, replacing God by Process, and allowing the universe to include incompossible totalities.[90] We could do something similar with Ṣadrā, and his universe would be much the same: a continuously transforming process in which entities become more real to the extent that they become more like themselves, and more connected to the extent that they participate mutually in the flow of being. We would not know whether the world was getting better, or just different, but we would have some criteria. Emadi argues that such an immanentist tweak is not even necessary: "Ṣadrā's emphasis on an infinite Divine as the only unchanged within the visible and invisible realms suggests an open universe with infinite possibilities for change and becoming."[91]

I think that the difference between immanentism and mysticism is not so great in the practice of FAPP—"for all practical purposes," as physicists say. The Ṣadrian universe is open insofar as it is a perpetual creation. Kalin observes that Muslim theologians argue that God always creates something anew, and his creation is never the same. So even in a religious universe, novelty is constant, for those of us who are not God. Furthermore, Kalin argues, "unity is needed for moral discernment because it entails a moral obligation to treat every being, living or not, with the respect that all deserve. The fact that I am connected to the rest of existence and that I am part of a bigger whole gives me a different perspective on things."[92] Knowing that we are connected to other entities in a whole that is changing, whether

that whole is open or closed (we do not know) encourages us to cultivate an ethical creativity. It keeps us alert.

The fly is now buzzing against my windowpane, and I gently shoo it out into the light.

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Acknowledgments

Notes

1. An example of contemporary errors arising from an ignorance of this long history is that Alain Badiou mistakenly accuses Deleuze of being a Platonist, because he does not take account of the Aristotelian and Islamic roots of the concept of univocity of being. See Badiou, *Deleuze*.
2. Libera, *La querelle des universaux*. Libera points out that Avicenna is here reviving Stoic thought.
3. Marks, "Deleuzian *Ijtihad*."
4. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 35.
5. Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy*, 67.
6. Quoted in Goodchild, "Deleuze and Philosophy of Religion."
7. Rizvi, *Mulla Sadra and Metaphysics*, 66–69.
8. I use this term because most philosophy in the classical Islamic world was written in Arabic, even by non-Arabic speakers. *Islamic philosophy* is accurate in most cases, to the degree that writers were engaging with Qurʾanic ideas.

9. Charles Burnett identifies sixty-eight translations of works of Averroes (Ibn Rushd) and twenty-four translations of works of Avicenna into Latin between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries ("Arabic into Latin").

10. Stone, "Why Europeans Stopped Reading Averroës."

11. Hasse, "Influence of Arabic and Islamic Philosophy."

12. Gutas, "Heritage of Avicenna"; Gutas, "Study of Arabic Philosophy."

13. Deleuze and Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?*, 93.

14. Jones and Roffe, *Deleuze's Philosophical Lineage*, for example, includes only Duns Scotus between Plato and Leibniz. Nathan Widder relates Duns Scotus's revision of the concept of univocity of being to Aristotle ("John Duns Scotus").

15. Herbert, *Some Years Travel* (London, 1634), 129, quoted in Rizvi, "Mulla Sadra."

16. Rizvi, "Mulla Sadra."

17. Jambet, *Act of Being*, 39; Rizvi, *Mulla Sadra and Metaphysics*, 12–14.

18. Morris, *Wisdom of the Throne*; Amin, *Philosophy of Mulla Sadra Shirazi*, a translation of and introduction to Ṣadrā's "Reasons."

19. Corbin, *Histoire de la philosophie islamique*; Nasr, *Islamic Philosophy*; Chittick, *In Search of the Lost Heart*.

20. Bonmariage, *Le Réel et les réalités*; Kalin, *Knowledge in Later Islamic Philosophy*; Rustom, *Triumph of Mercy*.

21. Jambet, *Act of Being*; Rizvi, *Mulla Sadra and Metaphysics*.

22. See the series Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology in Dialogue, edited by Daniela Verducci and William S. Smith, especially *Timing and Temporality in Islamic Philosophy and Phenomenology of Life*, edited by Anna-Teresa Tymienicka.

23. In English, just two whom I know of. See Emadi, "Motion within Motion"; Emadi, "Reconsidering the Substance of Digital-Video"; Marks, "Real Images Flow"; and Marks, "'We Will Exchange Your Likeness.'"

24. Leibniz, *Monadology*, §36.

25. Leibniz, *Monadology*, §§18, 36–38, 41–42. Sufficient reason in Leibniz is "what includes the event as one of its predicates" (Deleuze, *Fold*, 41).

26. Leibniz, *Monadology*, §61.

27. Leibniz, *Monadology*, §61.

28. Deleuze, *Fold*, 86.

29. The Arabic word *wujūd*, "what is found," is more suggestive than the English *being* or the German *Sein*, though some scholars carefully compare it to Heidegger's *Dasein*: for example, Acikgenc, *Being and Existence in Sadra and Heidegger*; El-Bizri, "Microcosm/Macrocosm Analogy";

Khamenei, "Time, Temporal, and Temporality"; and Kamal, *From Essence to Being*.

30. Ṣadrā, *Wisdom of the Throne*, quoted in Morris, *Wisdom of the Throne*, pt. 1, chap. 1, §2, 98.

31. They drew in turn on concepts of modulation from Aristotle and Ibn al-ʿArabī.

32. Bahmanyār ibn Marzubān, *Kitab al-Taḥṣīl*, quoted in Rizvi, *Mulla Sadra and Metaphysics*, 51.

33. Jambet, *Act of Being*, 86.

34. Ṣadrā al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Asfār*, quoted in Rizvi, *Mulla Sadra and Metaphysics*, 44.

35. Ṣadrā, *Elixir of the Gnostics*, chap. 3, §67, 53.

36. Ṣadrā al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Divine Witness*, quoted in Jambet, *Act of Being*, 75.

37. Jambet, *Act of Being*, 95. Jambet compares this goal of increased potency in Ṣadrā to that of Spinoza, which the latter developed in his own critique of Avicenna.

38. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 47.

39. This hope he holds in common with Charles Sanders Peirce, who wanted to believe that the totality of human understanding was constantly progressing, thanks to the sincere and disinterested efforts of the "community of scholars" over time.

40. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 223.

41. Deleuze, *Fold*, 130.

42. In *Basit al-haqiqa az didgah-e Mulla Sadra va monad-shinasi-ye Leibniz*, the Iranian philosopher Ali Asghar Zakavi compares Ṣadrā's ontology with Leibniz's monadology. I thank Sajjad Rizvi for this reference.

43. Majlisi, *Bihar al-anwar*, cited in Rizvi, *Mulla Sadra and Metaphysics*, 128.

44. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 88.

45. Rizvi, *Mulla Sadra and Metaphysics*, 97–98.

46. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 26.

47. See Rizvi, *Mulla Sadra and Metaphysics*, 122–23; and Rahman, *Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā*, 39.

48. Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, in Rahman, *Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā*, 81.

49. Rahman, *Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā*, 116.

50. Robert Latta, in Leibniz, *Monadology*, §57, 248–249n89.

51. Leibniz, "The Monadology," in *Philosophical Essays*, 220, quoted in Duarte, "Leibniz and Prime Matter," 444.

52. Ṣadrā, *Wisdom of the Throne*, quoted in Morris, *Wisdom of the Throne*, 98–99.

53. Morris, *Wisdom of the Throne*, 98–99.

54. Rizvi, *Mulla Sadra and Metaphysics*, 99.

55. Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, quoted in Rahman, *Philosophy*, 30.

56. Emadi, "Motion within Motion," 78–79.

57. Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, in Rizvi, *Mulla Sadra and Metaphysics*, 89.

58. Jambet, *Act of Being*, 96.

59. Rizvi, *Mulla Sadra and Metaphysics*, 87.

60. Jambet, *Act of Being*, 113.

61. Jambet, *Act of Being*, 84.

62. Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus*, 239, 241.

63. Deleuze, *Fold*, 77–79.

64. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 213.

65. Deleuze, *Fold*, 81.

66. Al-Jurjānī, *Asrār al-balaghah* (*The Secrets of Eloquence*), quoted in Deeb, *Al-Jurjani's Theory of Poetic Imagery*, 278. I discuss this in *Enfoldment and Infinity*, chap. 6.

67. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 88.

68. Cooper, "Mulla Sadra"; Elias, *Aisha's Cushion*, 214–15.

69. See James Williams's explication of this relationship in "Event."

70. Asking this, I do not wish for any of the steps of Deleuze's thought through the Stoics, Duns Scotus, Spinoza, Leibniz, Whitehead, and so many others who illuminated his thinking to be elided. But I am curious how the path might have been different.

71. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 33.

72. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, 19; see also Poxon and Stivale, "Sense, Series," 68.

73. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 38.

74. Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus*, 266; the remarks that follow refer to 266–71.

75. Emadi, "Motion within Motion," 94–95.

76. "All manifoldness of things is only a correspondingly varied mode of limiting the concept of the highest reality that forms their common substratum, just as all figures are only possible as so many modes of limiting infinite space" (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 492).

77. Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 13.

78. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, 148.

79. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, 148; my emphasis.

80. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, 150.

81. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, 148.
82. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, 149.
83. Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus*, 151–56.
84. Goodchild, "Deleuze and Philosophy of Religion," 150.
85. Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, 112; my emphasis.
86. See, e.g., Garnett, "Abstract Humor, Humorous Abstraction."
87. Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, in Rizvi, *Mulla Sadra and Metaphysics*, 89.
88. Rizvi, *Mulla Sadra and Metaphysics*, 89–93.
89. Ṣadrā, *Book of Metaphysical Penetrations*, 32.
90. Deleuze, *Fold*, 78–81.
91. Emadi, "Motion within Motion," 168.
92. Kalin, "Religion, Unity, and Diversity," 473.

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